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APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF INSURANCE POLICY INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE UNLESS ATTACHED TO PoLICY.-One of the purposes for the enactment of Section 58 of the New York Insurance
Law,1 requiring the whole contract for life insurance to be stated in
the policy, was to impose upon the insurer the duty of setting forth the
entire agreement as well as every statement or representation which
was material in inducing the insurer to contract if it was to be available as a defense.2 Under this. section, misrepresentations or erroneous statements made by the insured in his application for an insurance policy, which are not in the policy, are not available as a defense
inan action thereon.8 In other words, statements by the insured in
his application, or elsewhere, cannot be considered unless incorporated
in the policy. 4 This is in derogation of the common law, for prior to
the passage of Section 58 in 1906 all papers on which an insurance
company acted, when it had decided to grant a policy, were admissible
in an action upon it.5 The rule expressed by Section 58, which applies
only to life insurance, that the insured should be given a copy of all
the contractual provisions which may defeat or diminish his rights,
was applied by subdivision 1 of Section 142 to accident and health
insurance, and contracts of annuity.6
Since almost all insurers are corporations, they can act only
through agents. If their agents, acting within the scope of their
authority, cause estoppels to arise, such estoppels bind the corporate
insurer.7 In cases where the agents have knowledge of existing facts
concerning the applicant, which according to the terms of the policy
would prevent the policy from taking effect, it has been ruled that the
insurance company is estopped from disclaiming liability on the ground
of material misrepresentation since the knowledge of the agent is
imputed to the insurer.8 Furthermore, if the application is not
attached to the policy it is not a part of the contract, and, consequently, there is no breach of warranty. The fact that the policy con1N. Y. INs. LAW (1906) § 58: "Every policy of insurance issued or delivered within the state or after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and
seven, by any life insurance corporation doing business within the state shall
contain the entire contract between the parties and nothing shall be incorporated
therein by reference to any constitution, by-laws, rules, application or other
writings unless the same are indorsed upon or attached to the policy when

issued;
2 * * *."

Hurley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 247 App. Div. 547, 288

N. Y. Supp. 99 (4th Dept. 1926).

1 3Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 218 N. Y. 18, 112"N. E.
433 (1916); Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 176
N. E. 838 (1931); Lampke v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 279 N. Y. 157, 18 N. E. 14
(1938).
4
Murphy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 83 Misc. 475, 145 N. Y. Supp.
196 (1913), mod'd, 163 App. Div. 875, 147 N. Y. Supp. 565 (1st Dept. 1914).
5Rawls v. American Mut. Life Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282 (1863).
6 N. Y. INs. LAW (1939) § 142, subd. 1.
7VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THF LAW OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 529.
8 Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 838

(1931) ; Lampke v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 279 N. Y. 157, 18 N. E. 14 (1938).
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tained a provision to the effect that the agent could not waive any of
the provisions of the policy, does not have the retroactive effect of
nullifying a waiver or estoppel which had previously become effective.0
II
Due to the decisions of the courts holding that restrictions contained in the policy could not affect transactions which took place
prior to its delivery so as to nullify waiver or estoppels, insurers began
to use the application as the means of communicating limitations which
they wished to impose on the authority of their agents. The application in effect contains an offer, which, upon acceptance by the insurer,
constitutes a portion of the terms of the contract. 10 However, the
state legislature has sought to regulate this by providing that the
application containing such limitations is not incorporated into the
contract unless attached to the policy. In the case of Abbott v. The Prudential Insurance Company 11 an action was brought to recover upon
policies of industrial life insurance, the applications for which were
not attached to the policies. Each policy provided that the policy
would not take effect if the insured was not of sound health. The
applications limited the conduct of the agent by stating that he did not
have the power to modify the application or to bind the company by
receiving or making representations. The court held that although
this application was not a part of the contract the "entire contract"
statute did not prohibit the introduction of it as evidence, where it is
relevant upon a controversy as to matter extrinsic to the contract.
The reasoning of the court was that the insured was notified of the
limitation in the application before the contract was made, and where
there has been such a notification extrinsic of the policy the agent's
knowledge alone is not a ground upon which a waiver or an estoppel
as to any provision of the contract may be based. Evidence of such a
notification is admissible. The beneficiary cannot be allowed to
claim ignorance of matters revealed and so burden the insurer with a
liability it never intended to assume. This was a four-to-three decision. The dissenting opinion stated that proof of notification to the
insured of the limitation of the agent's authority may be shown by
evidence extrinsic to the policy but not by any statement in the application if it is not attached to the policy. The statute provides that nothing in the application can be made a part of the contract between the
parties, if it is not attached to the policy. To hold otherwise would permit the insurance company to perpetrate a fraud, since the knowledge
of the agent is imputed to the insurance company. Both the majority
and dissenting opinions interpret Justice Cardozo's opinion in Bible v.
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company ' 2 as favorable to
9 Ibid.
10 VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 434.

I281 N. Y. 375, 25 N. E. (2d) 141 (1939).
12256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 838 (1931)

(Here an agent for the defendant
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their decisions. However, that case cannot be used as authority for
the question involved in the Abbott case,'3 since in the Bible case14
there was no notification extrinsic to the policy of a limitation on the
apparent authority of the agent. The notice was in the policy and
was not given effect because it could not act by retroaction. Upon
5
careful examination of Judge Cardozo's opinion in the Bible case 11
one cannot fail to note that it is in accord with the dissenting opinion
of the Abbott case: 16
"Today, the restriction upon the authority of the agent and the
manner of its exercise is commonly stated in the application
signed by the insured. Controversy is foreclosed if the application is -annexed. Here it was not annexed and notice of the
limitation, if imparted must be proved in some other way. ; * *
The purpose of Section 58 of the Insurance Law in requiring
the whole contract to be stated in the policies, and not pieced
out by documents included by mere reference, was not the relief
of the insurer. It was the protection of the beneficiaries claiming under them. The Legislature had no design to make their
situation harder." 17
The dissenting judges agree with those presenting the majority opinion that proof of information conveyed orally or by writings other than
applications is admissible, but the latter fail to agree that a distinction
should be drawn between such proof of knowledge and proof of
knowledge made through offering in evidence a signed application.
They maintain that no interpretation of the letter or the spirit of the
statute justifies such a distinction. No dispute similar to the one
presented in the Abbott case has arisen in this state or dny other state
possessing a like statute. However, there have been cases in which
the unattached application was permitted to be introduced as evidence
without regard to the statute.' 8 - But not one of the cases caused the
Legislature to amend the existing statute. In the case of Edelson v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company19 an insurance policy was
issued providing that if the age of the insured be misrepresented the
amount payable shall be such as the premium paid would have purinsurance company visited a patient in an insane asylum and procured her signature to applications for insurance. He gave her the policy without the application attached and received payment of the premiums. The policy contained a
provision which stated that it would not go into effect if the insured was not in
good health at the time of the issuance of the policy).
13 281 N. Y. 375, 25 N. E. (2d) 141 (1939).
14256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 838 (1931).

15 Ibid.

See note 13, supra.
17 256 N. Y. 458, 464, 176 N. E. 838, 840 (1931).
18 Wilkins v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 23 Ga. App. 191, 97
S. E. 879 (1919) ; James v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co., 256 Ill. App.
436 (1933) ; Edelson v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 95 Misc. 218, 158 N. Y. Supp. 1018
(1916).
1995 Misc. 218, 158 N. Y. Supp.1018 (1916).
16
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chased at the correct age. The insured was sixty-six years of age
but gave his age as sixty in the application, which was not attached to
the policy. The court enforced the above provision of the policy and
in order to so hold the court permitted the introduction of the application as evidence on the ground that it was material and competent
evidence to show that the contingency had occurred which made the
provision effective. The court maintained that it was merely enforcing the contract according to the intent of the parties and was not
adding anything to the contract by introducing extrinsic evidence.
This is a lower court decision and appears to be in contradiction with
all the cases 2 0 holding that false statements made by an insured in an
application for insurance, which application was not attached to the
policy, were not a defense to an action thereon, even though the policy
contains a provision stating that the existence of a particular contingency, e.g., ill-health of the insured, would render the policy ineffective. These cases differ slightly from the Edelson case 21 because
there the occurrence of the contingency did not render the policy completely void, whereas in the other cases the policy became totally
ineffective. No language of the statute can be pointed out to justify
such a distinction, so as to make possible the rendition of different
verdicts.
It is submitted that the purpose of the Legislature, by amending
subdivision 1 of Section 142 of the Insurance Law, was to abrogate
the recently enunciated
22 doctrine as expressed in Abbott v. Prudential
Insurance Company
III

The amended section went into effect March 6, 1940. It provides:
"1. Every policy of life, accident or health insurance, or contract of annuity, issued or delivered in this state shall contain
the entire contract between the parties, and nothing shall be
incorporated therein by reference to any constitution, by-laws,
rules, application or other writings, unless a copy thereof is
endorsed upon or attached to the policy or contract when issued.
No application for the issuance of any such policy or contract
shall be admissible in evidence unless a true copy of application
was attached to such policy when issued." 23
The last sentence of the above section consists of the entire amendment. The amendment undoubtedly changes the law as expressed in
20

Archer v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U. S., 218 N. Y. 18, 112 N. E.
433 (1916); Bible v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 176
N. E. 838 (1931); Lampke v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 279 N. Y. 157, 18
N. E. 14 (1938).
2195 Misc. 218, 158 N. Y. Supp. 1018 (1916).
22 281 N. Y. 375, 25 N. E. (2d) 141 (1939).
23 N. Y. INs. LAw (1940) § 142, subd. 1, as amended L. 1940, c. 94, eff.
March 6, 1940.
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the Abbott case.24 Under the present statute no application is admissible in evidence, to decide either an extrinsic or intrinsic question,
if the application is not attached to the insurance policy. The amendment only provides for applications and makes no mention of any
other writings such as is made in the previously enacted part of the
section. Therefore, it follows that writings other than applications
are admissible in evidence when it is necessary to decide an extrinsic
question, even though they are not attached to the policy, particularly
since both the majority and the dissenting opinions in the Abbott
case 25 agreed on this point and it has not been disturbed by the
Legislature.
The insurance corporations may see fit to contest Section 142 as
being unconstitutional, on the ground that it interferes with their
contract rights under the United States Constitution. The insurance
business is quasi-public in character because of its vast effect on all
classes of people and their property. Therefore, it is competent for
the state by virtue of its police
power to regulate and control both the
26
and the contracts.
business
The principle underlying former Section 58, that the insurance
policy should .contain the entire contract, is a sound principle for the
protection of the public and its extension by Section 142 to insurance
policies other than for life is a further indication of the legislative
intention to add more weight to the unbalanced bargaining power of
the insured.
CATHERINE GREENFIELD.

DESIGNATION OF PARTICULAR INSURANCE AGENT PROHIBITED.

-The right to make contracts is protected by the "due process"
clause of the Federal Constitution.1 The courts have guarded few
rights more zealously, being ever on the alert to prevent an undue
invasion of this guarantee. 2 However, in the same breath, they have
constantly reiterated their holding that the right is not absolute, that
it must be restrained when the public welfare demands
it, 3 and legis4
constitutional.
as
upheld
be
will
effect
lation to that
24 281 N. Y. 375, 25 N. E. (2d) 141 (1939).

Ibid.

25
26 CADY,

THE LAW

OF

INSURANCE (3d ed. 1934) 79.

1 U. S. CONsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Adkins, et al. v. Children's Hospital, 261
U. S.525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 189
Fed. 769 (C. C. Kan. 1933).
2 Chas. Wolff Packing Co.'v. The Court of Industrial Relations of the
State of Kansas, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923) ; Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-operative Ass'n, 276 U. S.71, 48 Sup. Ct.
291 (1928) ; Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., et al., 284
U. S. 151, 52 Sup. Ct. 69 (1931).
3
Advance Rumely Thresher Co., Inc. v. Jackson, 287 U. S. 283, 53 Sup.
Ct. 133 (1932).
4West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S.379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).

